By Zubayer Ibn Kamal 

DHAKA, August 1, 2025 (BSS) - During the 2024 July Uprising, while many coordinated the movement from the frontlines, others led quietly from behind the scenes. Mahfuj Alam was one of the latter. Despite mass killings and widespread arrests by the Awami League government during the movement, he remained active in sustaining momentum.
 
At the 79th UN General Assembly, Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus introduced Mahfuz Alam at the 'Clinton Global Initiative Leaders Stage' as a key figure behind the uprising.

Born in 1998 in Lakshmipur, Mahfuj completed his Dakhil (equivalent to SSC) from a madrasa in Chandpur and his Alim (HSC) from Tamirul Millat Kamil Madrasa in Dhaka. He enrolled in the Department of Law at the University of Dhaka in the 2015-16 session.

During his student life, he engaged actively in cultural and literary circles-organizing reading groups and contributing to independent magazines. During the uprising, he served as a liaison committee member of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement. Following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, he was appointed Special Assistant to Interim Government Chief Adviser Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus. In February this year, he was sworn in as an adviser to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

In an exclusive interview with Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), Mahfuz Alam discusses the background of the July Uprising, the cultural consciousness of student-youth protesters, and the path to building a modern state.

BSS: From your perspective, what political and social factors made the July Uprising unavoidable?

Mahfuz Alam: The Awami League essentially forced a binary choice between "Shapla" and "Shahbagh," dividing the state into either Islamist or secular camps. This artificial polarization masked the real agenda: the monopolization of the 2014 election. The BNP's failed non-cooperation movement in 2015, along with government repression, pushed the country toward a style of governance that eliminated the opposition.

This vacuum paved the way for major movements like the anti-VAT protests and the Safe Roads movement. Then came the Dhaka University Central Students' Union (DUCSU) election. These three events marked a slow shift after the controversial 2018 elections.

After 2018, we started seeing the emergence of democratic pressure groups formed by youth outside the pro-Mujib establishment. Even though these weren't formal political organizations, they were, in essence, political fronts.

The college students who took part in 2018 protests had become university students by 2024. So they had seen the Awami League's misrule firsthand, making it easier for them to join the movement with political awareness. We also cannot ignore the movement against border killings.

Due to Indian aggression, border killings had become alarmingly frequent, and Sheikh Hasina's regime had effectively turned into a puppet government. This movement was the first to bring India's alarming aggression into public discourse.

On the other hand, from the murder of Biswajit Das in 2013 until 2018, there existed a dangerous culture of beating people to death on mere suspicion of being linked to Islami Chhatra Shibir. After the martyrdom of Abrar Fahad, that trend began to subside. His death awakened a deep emotional response among us.

On one side, the Awami League had become monstrous; on the other, a slow but determined resistance began to dismantle the narratives they had constructed. Taken together, these developments made a student-led mass uprising inevitable.

BSS: Was there any alternative to toppling authoritarian rule other than a mass uprising?

Mahfuz Alam: Frankly, it was impossible to remove the authoritarian Awami League through conventional politics. They had completely dismantled the electoral process. The BNP was deceived in 2018 participating in the election. By erasing the existence of an opposition, the Awami League blocked every path to a democratic transition.

There was, of course, the possibility of a military takeover. But since the BDR massacre, and due to involvement in political matters, the moral authority of the army had deteriorated. Also, the failures of the 1/11 military-backed caretaker government were still fresh in their minds.

The way Sheikh Hasina and her security adviser Tarique Siddique used the army further undermined its moral standing. So even that route was no longer feasible.

This required a front that wasn't seen as overtly hostile. The people were waiting for real leadership. As soon as students stepped forward, workers and the masses followed. That's why I believe the fall of Sheikh Hasina required a mass uprising-it was inevitable.

BSS: Previous movements often failed due to internal disagreements. How did people of such different ideologies unite during the July Uprising?

Mahfuz Alam: To be honest, every movement has compromising elements, and this one was no exception. There were certainly compromises here too. But because we had been engaged in campus activism for 7-8 years, we were well aware of where those compromises could arise. Every space has individuals who tend to compromise-we knew who they were.

That's why we were cautious from the very beginning and addressed potential points of disagreement early on. There were definitely people who could have created divisions, but we left no room for that to happen. As a result, we were able to move toward the mass uprising with a strong sense of unity.

BSS: We noticed that many of the student leaders at the forefront of the July Uprising had a strong cultural grounding-some led regular reading circles, others reviewed books or published magazines. How did this cultural awareness influence the uprising?

Mahfuz Alam: That's a very important discussion. In fact, I began by referring to the divide between Shapla and Shahbagh-which was fundamentally a cultural division. We saw in 2013 just how powerful cultural polarization can be. The country was culturally split into two. So we needed a group that was neither explicitly Islamist nor Islamophobic-a rare kind of brand, or perhaps even a rare generation.

We needed a group that wouldn't make Islamic scholars (alem) feel uneasy or suspicious of being betrayed, but also wouldn't alarm secularists into thinking they were trying to establish an Islamic state or pursuing some hidden religious agenda. That's where a centrist platform was essential.

We found that middle ground among madrasa students, college and university youth, and both rural and urban communities. This diversity helped bring people from different walks of life together.

Mujibist politics thrived on division. Even the BNP often felt unsure about whether to align with Islamic scholars. Meanwhile, the scholars themselves were gradually becoming disillusioned with opposition parties. This made Awami League's divisive politics even more effective.

So we started thinking-how do we overcome this? How do we create a manifesto that doesn't make one group uncomfortable about another, where no one feels alienated or suspicious? We worked for a long time on building an inclusive cultural understanding that could transcend Mujibist politics and unite people with differing ideologies.

Some of this work happened in the background, some more publicly. That's why at different times, different people stepped forward. Sometimes it was Akhter (member secretary of the NCP), sometimes Akram (joint member secretary), sometimes Nasir Uddin Patwari. They were all part of our same circle, and depending on the situation, someone would take the lead.

For example, Nahid Islam wasn't particularly well-known in political circles. He had once run for DUCSU's cultural secretary, but later faded into obscurity. He was connected to us, read regularly, but hadn't been politically active at that time. Asif (now Local Government Advisor) was involved in political activism. Another, Shoaib Abdullah, went into academic research. Nasir Uddin Patwari joined the AB Party at one point.

These individuals came from different backgrounds and paths, but they were all essentially working toward the same goal-finding a path to an inclusive centrist approach.

BSS: Then how did Nahid Islam come to the forefront of the movement?

Mahfuz Alam: At that time, Nahid Islam was politically a fresh face. If Akhter had taken the lead, it could have been framed as an anti-Awami League movement, so we intentionally kept him in the background.

If I had come forward, I would have been marked as well-and wouldn't have been able to carry on with the work behind the scenes. Asif Mahmud also didn't want to be in front at first, for some valid reasons. Akram had once been quite well-known on campus, but since 2023, he had shifted into business and become detached from campus politics. So, after considering all of this, we decided to bring Nahid forward while keeping everyone else in supportive but strategic roles.

Nahid hadn't been overexposed, and as someone educated in urban institutions, he connected more easily with the middle-class youth. I was working behind the scenes, liaising with various intellectual and cultural groups.

You could call this a division of labor. Our goal was to keep the dream alive. Who came forward or stayed behind didn't matter. It was like a theater-every role, even the smallest, mattered. I learned this in theater school: even if your role is to play a flutist in a corner, if you do it well, it completes the performance.

BSS: There have been reports that the government is considering a "Truth and Reconciliation" process to address the perpetrators of the July massacre. Do you think this would be an effective approach?

Mahfuz Alam: Truth is really about acknowledging and confronting reality. So what is "truth" in this context? Take for example the former Election Commissioner from the autocratic era-he recently admitted in court that during the Awami League's rule, national elections were rigged and far from free or fair. By saying this, he brought a certain truth into the open.

But these truths need to be acknowledged by the Awami League itself. Because legal prosecution is one thing, and moral accountability is another. From a moral standpoint, the Awami League must admit to these killings and face them head-on.

You can punish a criminal through the judicial process. But can you make a sinner innocent just by punishing them? You can't. They must come forward through a process of confession and repentance. 

Take, for example, a teacher who did not directly participate in the massacre-but who fully supported the Awami League, the party responsible for it. You cannot legally punish that teacher for genocide.

What he must do instead is acknowledge his moral complicity and seek forgiveness. Now, there may be ten different ways to express that repentance, but outside of a Truth and Reconciliation framework, there is no truly effective process for doing so. I am personally very hopeful. I believe this process can ultimately make us stronger as a nation. 

BSS: But there are a wide range of public reactions centering the trial of the July massacre. Are you still hopeful about the process? 

Mahfuz Alam: We needed a speedy trial to bring justice to victims of murder, enforced disappearances, and corruption. But our judiciary was destroyed too under the autocratic regime. The very institutions meant to deliver justice were destroyed.

So when trials began, they were slower than expected. Still, despite these challenges, solutions have been attempted. Two international crimes tribunals have been established. Citizens are also helping the trial process move forward.

I am hopeful that the families of the July martyrs and the public will soon see tangible justice.

BSS: Finally, we would like to know-when the single-point demand of the mass uprising was declared, it was accompanied by a vision for a new political settlement. In the post-uprising period, do you think we have progressed toward realizing that aspiration? As the state undergoes reforms, is our political culture also being reformed?

Mahfuz Alam: Honestly, a new political settlement is only possible when the existing political culture and practices are fundamentally reformed. You cannot expect to build a new political arrangement while following the same old procedural politics.

Let me tell you a story to explain this. After the formation of the Indian state, when Nehru came to power, there was virtually no opposition. He had the opportunity to become a dictator, since there was no real political challenge. But instead, Nehru invited Jayaprakash Narayan and encouraged him to build a strong opposition party. He wanted to uphold the democratic political culture of the state.

In contrast, when Bangladesh was formed, Sheikh Mujib found himself in a similar situation. But unlike Nehru, he did not embrace the opportunity to build a democratic state. The parties influenced by Mujibist ideology are still trying to govern the country the same way.

Now, if you do not respect or allow space for opposition forces, how can the state stand on solid democratic base? That's a core idea of politics. Politicians who are willing to work with opposition parties are very rare in Bangladesh. One exception was Begum Khaleda Zia. Sheikh Hasina attacked her in a vile and ruthless manner, but Khaleda Zia did not, in that sense, resort to politics of vengeance. The problem is, this culture never really took root in Bangladesh's political system.

Even now, we see that no party is willing to give their political rivals any space. If this continues, then how can we claim that political culture is being reformed?

So in my opinion, if the aspiration of the mass uprising is to be realized, political parties themselves will have to break away from existing norms and develop a new political culture.